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Abstract: This paper aims to assess current theoretical findings on 
the origin of coordination by salience and suggests a way to clarify 
the existing framework. The main concern is to reveal how different 
coordination mechanisms rely on specific epistemic aspects of reason-
ing. The paper highlights the fact that basic epistemic assumptions 
of theories diverge in a way that makes them essentially distinctive. 
Consequently, recommendations and predictions of the traditional 
views of coordination by salience are, in principle, based on the pro-
cesses related to the agent’s presumptions regarding the cognitive 
abilities of a co-player. This finding implies that we should consider 
these theories as complementary, and not competitive, explanations 
of the same phenomenon.  
Keywords: Coordination; correct belief; epistemic symmetry; ration-
ality; salience. 
1. Introduction  
 There are many coordination challenges in our everyday lives (greeting 
patterns, traffic rules, dancing moves, etc.), yet we do not feel that these 
820  Vojtěch Zachník 
Organon F 28 (4) 2021: 819–844 
kinds of everyday interactions involve some sort of obstacle because our 
behaviour usually seems straightforward and effortless. The key question is 
how this behaviour emerges for the first time if we cannot rely on precedent, 
agreement, or rules. What are the underlying processes enabling this type 
of interdependent behaviour of multiple agents? How many different but 
parallel ways can bring about coordination in this setting? The notion of 
salience was preliminarily specified in terms of “standing out” or “conspic-
uousness” (Schelling 1960; Lewis 1969a),1 and it was used to explain the 
process of inducing coordinated actions of agents who are not able to appeal 
to any stronger background or decision principle.2 Namely, an individual 
who wants to coordinate with others, but does not know which behavioural 
pattern is precisely suitable for the situation, may look for the assistance of 
a salient feature of an interaction (contextual clue, labelling of choice) and 
then coordinate (Schelling 1960).  
 Currently, the issue has been revived as the topic of the emergence of 
coordination is reflected by the new empirical evidence (Mehta et al. 1994; 
Bardsley et al. 2010; Colman et al. 2014). In general, my aim is to assess 
two leading proposals and answer the following question: Is it the case that 
people coordinate by salience because they frame contextual cues and con-
ceive the situation from a new perspective—as described by the variable 
frame theory (Bacharach and Bernasconi 1997; Bacharach and Stahl 2000; 
Bacharach 2006), or because individuals have a ‘hunch’ about another’s 
behaviour and try to respond to this as best as possible—as suggested by 
the cognitive hierarchy theory (Camerer and Chong 2004)? I want to argue 
that both theories are built upon some elementary assumptions about the 
beliefs of others, and the logical structure of these epistemic foundations 
makes these two approaches compatible. Therefore, I suggest there are two 
parallel kinds of salience-based coordination processes (based on the above-
                                                 
1 Alternatively, Sugden (2011) defines salience more clearly as “an individual’s pre-
reflective perception that certain elements of the situation stand out from the rest”. 
2 There are three widely accepted ways of how coordination can emerge (Lewis 
1969, 24–42). The first two are implicit and not purposeful: coordination based on 
salience, the one I am discussing in the paper, and coordination due to precedent 
(Schelling 1960, chap. 4; Young 1996). The third is an explicit communication such 
as agreement.  
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mentioned theories), and their usage is determined by the epistemic context 
of an interaction. More specifically, I will show that epistemically symmet-
rical conditions of interaction favour reasoning modelled by variable frame 
theory, whereas epistemically asymmetrical conditions support reasoning 
with cognitive hierarchy. 
 The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 I reveal the problem of 
coordination, and why it presents a challenge for any theory of coordination. 
Section 3 discusses two recent and dominant views of salience which are then 
described and analyzed in terms of their epistemic underpinnings in Section 
4. Finally, Section 5 summarizes my argument by introducing notions of ep-
istemic symmetry and asymmetry and reflects some general implications. 
2. Coordination Problem 
 In the opening paragraph, I have briefly mentioned cases in which people 
try to coordinate their behaviour to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome. 
For example, a pedestrian and a car driver face the crucial decision of 
whether to wait or go once they reach an intersection at the same time 
(assuming there are no traffic lights). Undoubtedly, their goal is to arrive 
at a state of the world in which the only one chooses to go, while the other 
waits. Similarly, when we meet someone in a theatre, we tend to greet this 
person. But how? Should we hug a person, kiss her, shake her hand? In 
game theory, it is common to use a notion of coordination game to denote 
a strategic interaction that poses an issue of selection between many viable 
alternatives. The game represents a situation in which two or more agents 
make a decision from the set of available options with the intention of di-
recting their actions towards a certain outcome. Moreover, agents’ prefer-
ences in the interaction are such that they favour the same outcome (since 
it is beneficial for both of them), and that outcome cannot be achieved by 
acting alone or by neglecting to consider others’ actions. Because of this, 
each player forms beliefs about other agents’ actions to estimate the poten-
tial consequences.3 It is also important to keep in mind that the preference 
                                                 
3 In other words, coordination as a type of strategic interaction expresses the idea 
that beliefs about others have an important significance within this decision-making 
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coincidence is a central feature for distinguishing coordination from situa-
tions with some degree of conflict, such as zero-sum games or mixed-motive 
games.4  
 In order to generalize these ordinary intuitions and to abstract struc-
tural properties from any contingent features, I build a simple game-theo-
retical model of a prototypical coordination interaction. For the sake of 
simplicity, assume a two-player pure coordination matching game (more 
specifically, a one-shot non-cooperative normal form game with perfect in-
formation): 
 Γ = (N, S, U) 
  Set of players:  N = (i, j) 
  Set of Strategies:  S = (s1, s2, s3) … for i and j ∈ N. 
Payoffs:  Let ui (si, sj) denote player i’s payoff given her 
strategy si and co-player’s strategy sj.  
  U:   U (si, sj) … if si = sj then ui = uj = 1 
         … if si ≠ sj then ui = uj = 0 
Based on this formal game-structure, it is easy to represent the interaction 
by a payoff-matrix, because the formal n-tuple, Γ, contains all the infor-
mation necessary for such a move. 
 sj1 sj2 sj3 
si1 1, 1 0, 0 0, 0 
si2 0, 0 1, 1 0, 0 
si3 0, 0 0, 0 1, 1 
Figure 1. Pure Coordination game 
                                                 
process. This aspect makes it different from decisions such as whether I should take 
an umbrella today if I suspect that it might rain, or, when buying a new car, the 
consideration of such factors as fuel consumption and safety.   
4 Schelling (1960) suggested a concept of a continuum of interactions with two 
extremes on either side: pure coordination (agents’ preferences perfectly coincide), 
and pure conflict (preferences are directly opposed). 
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 You can see that the players decide simultaneously what to do, and then 
they establish an outcome of the game, a product of their strategy-combi-
nation (chosen from row and column by respective players). Given this, we 
can easily and clearly evaluate their choices, and say how preferable the 
result is considering their utilities.5 
 However, what complicates this situation is a feature of the game that 
allows three possible outcomes to be equally acceptable (ranked by both 
player with utility 1).6 This is the coordination problem. It is a problem 
because it questions our competence to decide what exactly the solution of 
the game is, and therefore it imposes the difficulty of selection (Harsanyi 
and Selten 1988). In real-life situations, people usually use agreement to 
solve the indeterminacy, or they rely on some precedent that helps to sta-
bilize their expectations of a possible solution. On the other hand, under 
circumstances when agents cannot communicate and no pattern of behav-
iour from previous encounters is known, there is still one remaining way to 
solve this curse of symmetry. External factors can make one of the choices 
somehow salient. Intuitively speaking, salience breaks the symmetry by the 
fact that some strategies will stand out and appear strikingly different in 
comparison to others. 
3. Theories of Salience 
 The focus of interest for the rest of the paper, therefore, is a particular 
model of interactions that are well represented in everyday life, and the role 
                                                 
5 The assumptions behind this are the standard ones: preferences are expressed in 
Von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, and players are rational in the sense that they 
maximize expected utility due to common knowledge assumptions. 
6 In game-theoretical terms, the game has three payoff-symmetric pure Nash equ-
ilibria. In addition to these, there is also Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. For 
more details on categories of coordination games, see Camerer (2003). Also, it is 
worth mentioning that the many-solutions problem is crucial for the game because 
the coincidence of interests is not a sufficient condition for coordination, as shown 
by Ullmann-Margalit (1977, 79–80). 
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of salience in these interactions.7 However, the phenomenon of salience (as 
preliminarily mentioned in Section 1) is, for now, placed in a more refined 
theoretical foundation that provides more robust explanatory grounds for 
reflection on different modes of reasoning. I will briefly introduce two prom-
inent theories of salience-based coordination—variable frame theory, and 
cognitive hierarchy theory—and then reveal their epistemic background to 
show why I think these theories complement each other. 
 Michael Bacharach invented a formal extension of the game-theoretical 
model of coordination in variable frame theory (Bacharach and Bernasconi 
1997; Bacharach and Stahl 2000; Bacharach 2006).8 It attempts to explain 
a salient choice in terms of conceptual frames or labelling, given that, it 
takes a step beyond orthodox game theory by enriching apparatus with the 
notion of frame.9 Frame is a set of concepts or labels by which the agent 
perceives the interactive situation, and Bacharach accounts for a salient 
choice in terms of the agent’s framed decision-making. If individuals con-
ceptualize interaction through the same lens, then salience may occur and 
guide their decisions towards coordination. Suppose you are playing a 
matching game with another person and you must choose from a set of five 
distinct objects: whisky, wine, water, beer, or sherry (assume they have 
stickers attached to them, so you do not have to taste them). Variable 
frame theory assumes that players describe the interaction through various 
predicates. For instance, alcoholic and non-alcoholic suggest themselves as 
                                                 
7 Technically speaking, all attention is devoted to a one-shot normal form coordi-
nation game in which the preferences of agents perfectly coincide and no communi-
cation or (direct) past experience is allowed. Unless stated otherwise, in all remaining 
sections I consider such a game as the default option. 
8 Bacharach followed in the footsteps of Gauthier (1975), and significantly exten-
ded his original intuition by providing a comprehensive theoretical framework. It 
was Gauthier who first innovatively suggested that salience induces a payoff-modi-
fication that transforms the original pure coordination game into a game with 
asymmetric equilibria (Hi-Lo game); and he augmented the account by the principle 
of coordination, which states the normative claim for an agent to choose a payoff-
dominant equilibrium. 
9 In traditional game theory, it does not matter how an agent perceives a game 
since theorists have an objective way to describe interaction by indicating strategies 
and payoffs. See Luce and Raiffa (1957). 
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obvious categories. The non-alcoholic drink (water) appears to be a good 
candidate for the salient choice (cf. Bardsley et al. 2010).  
 Why? To detail how this process of framing works, I show the formali-
zation of the example in conformity with Bacharach (2006). The standard 
model of game is extended with frame F containing different families of 
predicates (here, generic family F0 and F1) and these families are, moreover, 
specified by parameters of how likely their occurrence is in the player’s mind 
(availability, v(F) = p; 0 ≤ p ≤ 1), and what strategies—in the sense of 
traditional objective game—are among the predicates in the family (exten-
sion of a predicate, E). As a result of this configuration, it is possible to 
capture the idea of how salience transforms the payoff structure of the game. 
 Γbevarages = (N, S, U, F) 
  N = (i, j), S = (whisky, wine, water, beer, sherry) 
  U: U (si, sj) … if si = sj then ui = uj = 1 
          … if si ≠ sj  then ui = uj = 0 
  Fi = {F0, F1}, E: F→S     
F0 = {thing}; E(thing) = {whisky, wine, water, beer, sherry}, 
v(F0) =1 
   F1 = {alcoholic, non-alcoholic}; v(F1) =1 
   E(alcoholic) = {whisky, wine, beer, sherry},  






Pick a thing 
Choose the 
non-alcoholic 
1, 1 0, 0 0.2, 0.2 
Pick an alco-
holic 
0, 0 0.25, 0.25 0.2, 0.2 
Pick a thing 0.2, 0.2 0.2, 0.2 0.2, 0.2 
Figure 2. Framed matching game 
 In comparison to all other possibilities, the non-alcoholic drink offers the 
best chance for a match in coordination, as the extension of the predicate 
contains only one element. This conclusion is not very surprising, but the 
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formal notation reveals further details.10 First, an important consequence of 
framed games is that they break the curse of symmetry by introducing 
asymmetrical equilibria (in bold in Figure 2).11 Therefore, the coordination 
problem is essentially altered into a new game structure (Hi-Lo game) solely 
under the influence of framing. Second, this reshaping of the original pure 
coordination game brings us closer to an explanation. However, it does 
not—in this form—establish a definite solution to the game. The reason for 
this is simple: a player may be equally justified in ‘picking an alcoholic 
drink’ if he or she reasonably expects the other to make the same decision.   
 The missing piece of the puzzle is the kind of reasoning that supports 
this decision. Could a player appeal to some principle of coordination when 
choosing a Hi-equilibrium (in my example ‘choosing the non-alcoholic 
drink’)? Variable frame theory answers this question by explaining this 
mechanism and providing its elaborate justification. Rational agents do not 
consider their choices only on the basis of standards of individual rational-
ity—they think as a team, considering what is beneficial for them, collec-
tively.  
 This means that a new principle of rationality enters the scene, with the 
formal consequence of directing individuals’ choices towards a Pareto-opti-
mal equilibrium.12 Bacharach is convinced that there are strong reasons that 
lead individuals to team-beneficial choices since we tend to identify with a 
certain group. In particular, group identification occurs as a result of  
                                                 
10 Keep in mind that both theories I present provide a formal explanation of sa-
lience, therefore they make no further assumptions as to what specific factors trigger 
this effect. Moreover, I believe that every substantive theory would be incomplete in 
its content since it is difficult to list all significant building blocks. And of course, 
the vast diversity of cultural contexts makes this effort even harder. 
11 What happens in special cases when there are many singleton predicates or ava-
ilability of families of predicates variables is not an important issue here because it 
does not weaken my conclusion. For a complete account, see Bacharach and Ber-
nasconi (1997) and Bacharach (2006). 
12 Strategy combination (si, sj) is Pareto-optimal if there is no other combination 
(si*, sj*) ∈ S that satisfies: 
 a) ∀i ∈ N, U(si*, sj*) ≥ U(si, sj) 
 b) ∃i ∈ N, U(si*, sj*) > U(si, sj) 
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perceived common interest, or strong interdependence (Bacharach 2006, 
142–44), and is followed by the mode of team reasoning (or we-reasoning).13 
Variable frame theory, broadly speaking, establishes a new form of non-
standard reasoning that revises the traditional conception of rationality 
such that agents are now considered to be capable of recognizing an effi-
cient outcome that gives them the best prospect of coordinating.14 There-
fore, salient choice is produced by a particular frame that transforms 
a game-structure from pure coordination to Hi-Lo game, and then agents 
make a decision as team members in favour of a mutually beneficial out-
come. These two essential components of the theory—framing and team 
reasoning—reliably explain why ‘water’ is the salient choice in the proto-
typical matching game.  
 But, to make things more complex, there is another alternative expla-
nation for coordination by salience that stems from cognitive hierarchy the-
ory (Camerer and Chong 2004).15 This model is, in principle, based on the 
assumption of a boundedly rational agent, who takes a limited number of 
reasoning steps before he or she decides, and, in the case of coordination, 
whose strategic thinking is rooted in some kind of rudimentary non-strategic 
non-rational salience. Hence, an overall account of salience-based coordina-
tion presented by this theory rests on two pillars: one that establishes weak 
symmetry-breaking behaviour, and the second, which postulates a finite 
belief hierarchy, and an individual who chooses the best strategic response 
                                                 
13 Some have identified several problems with team reasoning. It seems to be too 
narrowly specified in terms of social categorization (Hindriks 2012), and somewhat 
unstable in experimental testing either due to slight payoff asymmetry (Crawford, 
Gneezy, and Rottenstreich 2008) or due to the influence of other strategic options 
(Cooper et al. 1990).   
14 This revisionary standpoint is, however, highly controversial as it puts into qu-
estion a standard assumption of game theory—methodological individualism. Yet, 
on the other hand, many experimental studies show evidence in favour of this rea-
soning mode (Bacharach and Bernasconi 1997; Colman, Pulford, and Rose 2008; 
Bardsley et al. 2010). 
15 The theory was initially developed to provide another way of thinking about 
solution concepts in game theory. And it had an impact on dominance-solvable 
games (e.g., Beauty Contest Game), but it also provides an interesting framework 
for thinking about coordination problem in a new way.  
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with regard to his or her beliefs.16 But how do these two features fit to-
gether? The whole result of salience proceeds in two steps that are captured 
and formalized by the theory. Initially, there is a non-uniform probability 
distribution on the set of strategies, sometimes known as primary salience 
(Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden 1994), whose role is to disrupt the symmetry 
of the coordination problem. A natural interpretation of this could be that 
agents have a psychological propensity to pick some strategies without any 
incentive and in the absence of strategic reasoning. Such behaviour then 
exhibits randomization over some strategies that might be particular to 
a certain cultural background, contextual information, or simply because of 
their uniqueness and conspicuousness. This part of the story might be suf-
ficient to explain “picking behaviour”, or why there is a concentration of 
choices in aggregate, as supposed by Schelling (1960), and tested by Bards-
ley et al. (2010). However, the presence of coordination success on many 
occasions demands a fuller explanation.  
 At this point, the second element, belief hierarchy, becomes involved. 
The theory introduces agents of various levels of reasoning who have the 
cognitive ability to recognize lower-level agents, and to choose the best 
strategy (best-response)17 given their assumptions about other players and 
their choices (Stahl and Wilson 1995; or Haruvy and Stahl 2007). Therefore, 
it attempts to establish an apparatus whose expressivity allows us to grasp 
the intuition that agents have a certain depth of reasoning and the cognitive 
ability to understand other minds (Ohtsubo and Rapoport 2006). In this 
respect, there are categories of agents depending on how many steps have 
been taken, or let us say that each of them is assigned a certain level of 
reasoning. For instance, a level 0 player (or L0) lies at the bottom of the 
hierarchy and has no mental model of other players’ choices or reasoning 
abilities. His behaviour in coordination is fully characterized by the non-
                                                 
16 The origins of this idea can be traced back to Lewis (1969b, 24–36) and his 
account that coordination is feasible only by means of a system of high-order ex-
pectations. 
17 The best-response decision rule is essentially based on the strict dominance pri-
nciple—a core element of decision-making. It assumes that a rational agent can eli-
minate all strategies that are, in all respects, worse than the other options.  
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uniform probability distribution p0 (i.e., primary salience).18 Next, level 1 
represents an agent who is convinced that all her co-players are L0, and she 
decides to maximize her chances of a match with the others. The intuitive 
understanding of the model is that the level 1 player tries to guess what the 
most probable choice is according to his peers, influenced by primary sali-
ence, and then chooses the best response to that behaviour. The same holds 
for all higher-level reasoners: they expect others to be lower-level agents, 
and they have particular beliefs about the frequency of these types in the 
population. In other words, these beliefs express the probability of an en-
counter with a given type. For example, a level 2 player believes that he 
may coordinate with someone who is either L1 or L0, and acts in order to 
maximize his expected utility in anticipation of the respective behaviour of 
his co-player. 
 The specific implications of cognitive hierarchy theory for coordination 
games is straightforward: players—depending on their type—maximize 
their chance of compliance with others based on generally recognized pri-
mary salience (or picking behaviour), which successively leads to a concen-
tration of choices around one of the equilibria. This dynamic process of 
reasoning sooner or later selects one of the possible alternatives with the 
support of original non-uniform probability distribution. As an example, 
consider the familiar game with beverages except now I will analyse it is 
using the apparatus of cognitive hierarchy theory. The first obstacle 
emerges with the issue of how to determine the likelihood of choosing 
a drink, i.e. p0. The traditional answer is that we do not have to specify this 
a priori because, essentially, it is a matter of empirical research. The aim 
of the theory of salience-based coordination is not to enumerate all the 
sources of salience, but, rather, to demonstrate the formal consequences 
leading to one solution. Thus, as someone who lives in a country with a fa-
mous beer-drinking culture, I will imagine that primary salience in this case 
                                                 
18 One idealized assumption is that p0 distribution is for all agents (even for higher 
levels) the same. The reason for such simplification is as follows: if theorists want to 
model salience-based behaviour then they think that the contextual background is 
commonly shared. Even though this might seem restrictive, as some individuals 
might display minor variations, the underlying idea is correct, at least for the in-
strumental purposes of the theory.  
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highlights one of the alcoholic drinks. Whatever an individual’s choice is, 
let me assume a stable, reliable, and population-wide pattern of primary 
salience, for instance p0 = {0.15 whisky, 0.2 wine, 0.1 water, 0.4 beer, 0.15 
sherry}. This describes a feature of what some individual picks if he or she 
would not consider others, but simply follow non-reflective inclinations. Alt-
hough this behaviour occurs in coordination, the theory predicts some 
agents will strategize and focus on limited strategic thinking. A level 1 agent 
expects her co-player to behave in accordance with primary salience, and 
therefore she will choose pure strategy sl1 = {beer} since it gives her the 
highest expected utility (ul1(sl1, p0) = 0.4). A Level 2 player believes that he 
may encounter either level 1 or level 0 with corresponding probabilities q1 
and q0 (where q1 + q0 = 1), and he also forms beliefs concerning their be-
haviour (sl1, p0). But how should and will a boundedly rational L2 agent 
act? Even if he imagines the scenario in which his co-player is certainly 
either type 1 or type 0 (i.e., q0 = 1 or q1 = 1), his best strategy is always to 
choose sl2 = {beer}.19 Therefore, cognitive hierarchy theory describes coor-
dination behaviour in this interaction as a gradual increase of the concen-
tration of choices around one specific alternative. 
 To summarize, cognitive hierarchy theory explains salience by other 
means. Coordinating behaviour emerges rather as the result of the expecta-
tion of which option is most likely to be selected (given the various types 
of agents who may or may not think strategically). It is accepted that some 
players might be choosing blindly, but, overall, coordination is a result of 
a convergence of choices (in the example, it is convergence to the most 
popular drink). In comparison to variable frame theory, agents do not have 
to think as team members, and salience does not create a direct structural 
transformation. But let us pause for a moment and think more about what 
the analysis of the beverage game further reveals. The case clearly demon-
strates the somewhat disturbing and striking result of divergent predictions 
provided by each of these theories in the very same game-setting. Whereas 
one theory ends with the selection of water, the second would suggest beer, 
and the question—What would you like me to drink?—seems to have no 
definite answer for now.  
                                                 
19 Expected utility for L2 player is ul2(beer) = q1 + 0.4q2, therefore 1 ≥ u(sl2) ≥ 0.4.  
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 Of course, in many other cases, the practical implication of the models 
would be identical, since one needs no more than to suppose that primary 
salience points in the same direction as a particular frame, keeping in mind 
that theoretical explanations and underlying assumptions differ (Bacharach 
and Stahl 2000). But the value of test cases such as the game with beverages 
rests more on the promise of assessing experimentally which theory is sup-
ported by the data, and the identification of a correct explanatory model. 
Unfortunately, the alleged behavioural litmus test did not provide results 
as promising as had been expected (Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden 1994; 
Bardsley et al. 2010; Colman, Pulford, and Lawrence 2014), and the prob-
lem seems to be, rather, that two parallel modes of reasoning are possible, 
and may influence individuals’ decision-making in this type of situation. 
The question, then, is how to reconcile these dual processes?  
4. Correct beliefs and belief in rationality 
  My proposal for a solution will be based on the idea that modes of rea-
soning in coordination with salience sustain certain epistemic standards 
which must be implicitly recognized by the interacting agents.20 Hence, even 
before it comes to establishing the coordination outcome, every involved 
and strategically thinking agent makes some estimates concerning possible 
interaction scenarios, his or her co-player's behaviour, and beliefs (similarly 
Janssen 2001). Therefore, one can consistently claim that variable frame 
and cognitive hierarchy theory together provide an explanation of the co-
ordination problem because each theory relies on different epistemic stand-
ards. In a nutshell, different epistemic background induces a distinctive co-
ordination mechanism. 
 As we have seen with cognitive hierarchy theory, this approach of re-
stricted reasoning belongs to a broader class of theories known as bounded 
rationality. And, as such, it makes rather less demanding epistemic assump-
tions, which are embedded into the concept of agent. First of all, cognitive 
                                                 
20 In this spirit, I follow in the footsteps of the established programme of epistemic 
game theory, aiming to clarify solution concepts and their underlying epistemic pri-
nciples. See more on this in de Bruin (2009) or Perea (2012). 
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hierarchy theory violates correct beliefs assumption. This is an important 
point in my argument I will specify later, but for now, it is sufficient to say 
that violation of correct beliefs means that even if coordination has been 
achieved by salience, we cannot say that individuals have correct beliefs 
about themselves. Thus, an inevitable consequence of cognitive hierarchy 
model is that every strategically thinking agent is, in fact, acting rationally 
(he decides for the best option with regard to his or her beliefs and level), 
even though he has an incorrect belief about his partner in coordination 
(there is an epistemic disharmony between individuals). The problem, 
therefore, is deeply rooted in the fact that an agent believes that a co-player 
is systematically mistaken in what behaviour the co-player attributes to the 
agent himself.  
 To illustrate this point, let me use the before-mentioned beverage-choos-
ing game (Section 3). For instance, imagine a situation of two friends, John 
and Isaac, who want to order the same drink in a crowded bar with loud 
music. The only thing that matters is to have the same drink because they 
do not want to drink more than one type of beverage. Unfortunately, they 
have been separated by the crowd and each has to make an order inde-
pendently of the other’s decision. They face a typical coordination problem. 
How can they solve it? Cognitive hierarchy theory predicts that each will 
choose or pick a drink depending on his cognitive level. The crucial aspect 
now, however, is what beliefs they have about each other. Let say that John 
believes that Isaac will choose beer because he believes that John himself is 
randomly picking one of the drinks, and beer seems like the most attractive 
option (primarily salient). Given that, John chooses beer too, though he 
does that knowing that Isaac is mistaken about his actual beliefs. Remem-
ber, John believes that Isaac thinks that he is randomly picking. Coordina-
tion in this case will be successful despite the obvious epistemic discord.  
 Now, I will illustrate the issue of incorrect beliefs more formally, which 
allows me to capture this feature of the theory in a precise manner. I will 
assume that both agents (John and Isaac) are of the same level, say L2 
players. Both expect that the partner will be L1 or L0 (with respective 
probabilities); and if their partner is L1, L2 player will also think that the 
co-player (as a L1 agent) has some beliefs about him, namely that L1 will 
think she is paired with an L0 player. However, we need to know not just 
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the agent’s relevant level, but also information about his strategies. Then, 
it may be useful to represent formally by means of a simple notation such 
as ti2beer that each individual has a certain epistemic type for a given depth 
of reasoning and chosen strategy; ti2beer indicates that Isaac’s (agent i’s) 
epistemic type is specific for an L2 player who is choosing the strategy 
beer.21 Epistemic type in a nutshell is a convenient way to express the beliefs 
an individual has, and how they are structured. Bearing this in mind, it is 
not very difficult to describe an agent’s type for the game as follows: 
ti2beer: tj1beer → ti0alcoholic     
tj2beer: ti1beer → tj0alcoholic 
 In this display, you can see a case of how two agents of the very same 
level, on the one hand, have false expectations regarding the other player’s 
level. Isaac (ti2beer) believes that John is L1, whereas, in fact, he is tj2. This 
trivial result, though, can be easily avoided simply by stipulating that John 
is actually tj1, and then it would prevent this type of incorrectness, which 
is not my direct concern here. On the other hand, a much more important 
implication of the model lies in what Isaac (ti2) thinks about John’s expec-
tations about him. As previously stated, ti2 believes that he is interacting 
with John of L1.22 Or, more precisely, he believes that co-player j is a tj1 
player who chooses beer because John expects that Isaac is an L0, who 
randomizes amongst alcoholic drinks (in accordance with p0) and has no 
model of his co-players. And conversely, the same holds for tj2beer. Thus, 
a crucial consequence of cognitive hierarchy theory is that the agent (ti2) 
assumes that his co-player is fundamentally wrong in her belief about how 
he will behave. This kind of incorrectness is different from the first, con-
cerned with the hypothetical versus the actual level of the agent, and, fur-
thermore, is a profound feature of the theory that helps outline its epistemic 
coordination roots. 
                                                 
21 Type-space notation is suitable here for the reason that it allows us to compre-
hend an aspect of nested beliefs in a simple and elegant way. Cf. Sillari (2008) or 
Geanakoplos (1992).  
22 This is a harmless simplification, as I assume that q1=1. 
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 An important lesson here is that such description reveals a general ten-
dency built into the theory: a rational agent (of sufficiently high level)23 
believes that the partner is fundamentally mistaken in his expectation about 
whom he is interacting with. And because of this, it is consistent to say 
that one might observe coordinating behaviour despite the fact that the 
beliefs the agents have about others contain an internal error. This finding, 
furthermore, is robust since there is no change in the result even if we admit 
some variations in the expected composition of a population, or in the depth 
of reasoning.24 To shed more light on this epistemic aspect of the theory is 
just the first step in my analysis, but I believe it delivers a non-trivial phil-
osophical finding regarding how decision-making individuals reflect mental 
states and the reasoning processes of others, and what they might justifiably 
ascribe to them in coordination by salience. Since correct belief assumption 
plays a further crucial role, I need a precise notion of it, which may also 
bring some understanding of what exactly is violated by the cognitive hier-
archy model.  
Correct belief assumption: 
An agent’s beliefs—that is, agent’s epistemic type (ti)—for a particular 
(coordination) interaction are such that she believes that other agent 
involved in the situation has beliefs (tj) about her behaviour such that 
it holds that these beliefs are accurate and correct.25 
                                                 
23 This condition assumes that the agent has a ’theory of other minds’, which holds 
when he or she is L2 or higher. 
24 Imagine a more sophisticated case: a person who is an L3 player and has an 
expectation that she may interact with an individual of each level with some positive 
probability (q0, q1, q2). Then we can express her relevant epistemic type for the 
beverage-choosing game in the following manner: 
 ti3beer: q2 ×tj2beer + q1 × tj1beer + q0 × tj0alcoholic     
 tj2beer→ ti1beer → tj0alcoholic 
 tj1beer → ti0alcoholic     
 Formalization like this allows us to see the profound basis of epistemic 
asymmetry of cognitive hierarchy theory concerning one strategic aspect (choice of 
strategy in particular).  
25 The correctness simply implies that it is the case that, in the belief hierarchy, 
agents assume their beliefs about actions and beliefs of their partners are the same 
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 Now this definition and formal description allow us to see one aspect of 
cognitive hierarchy theory that results from the hierarchical structure and 
underlying assumptions.26 But we should not lose sight of the fact that 
correct belief assumption expresses a more general idea of coordination and 
its epistemic context. The case of cognitive hierarchy theory has merely 
shown at what costs the assumption can be violated if we want to achieve 
coordination anyway.  
 How does this analysis help us with variable frame theory? Is there any 
difference or similarity with respect to the correctness of the agents’ beliefs? 
In section 3, I have briefly explained that variable frame theory proceeds 
by two distinct steps: structural transformation, and team-coordination. 
Both make different demands on the individuals involved, yet they are fully 
adaptable to the formal framework presented and, are, therefore, easy to 
comprehend and compare. The major difference between the theories lies in 
the concept of frame that makes salience-based coordination more refined 
and subtle because it introduces partitions on the strategy set (instead of 
rather coarse primary salience). If we state that individuals in interaction 
have the same frame according to which they look upon the coordination 
problem, then the theory predicts, in this idealized case, that their choices 
will intersect in a Pareto-optimal result.27 All of this we know already from 
above, but the question is whether the outcome is in line with correct belief 
assumption, or against it. We are already familiar with the answer to the 
question “What would you like me to drink?”—It is water (the single mem-
ber of non-alcoholic group). Nonetheless, it is better to show the epistemic 
                                                 
throughout the nested structure of beliefs (Perea 2012, 145–46). It does not imply 
that those beliefs are true because there might be many consistent and correct belief 
combinations, for instance in a game with many Nash Equilibria. 
26 To be entirely clear, authors of cognitive hierarchy theory briefly acknowledge 
this conclusion. (Camerer, Ho, and Chong 2004, 869) My concern relates more to 
other applications and experiments where this issue is often disregarded. 
27 I assume that there is a commonly shared context of interaction which allows 
the formation of a particular frame. It is not very controversial to proceed in this 
way because I have already accepted that salience-based coordination involves ex-
ternal factors. Obviously, there are some additional conditions to be fulfilled to se-
cure a clear result (e.g., symmetry disqualification, trade-off principle), for more 
details see Bacharach (1997). 
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background of the solution of the game in a similar fashion as before, with 
only a slight modification in subscripts. Instead of representing cognitive 
level (which is irrelevant information for variable frame theory), numbers 
in the agent’s epistemic type help us to specify the frame available to him. 
For instance, ti01water states that both F0 and F1 as defined in Γbevarages are 
families of predicates that agent i (Isaac again) takes into account when he 
chooses water. Then it is straightforward to express the agents’ epistemic 
types for variable frame theory accordingly: 
ti01water: tj01water → ti01water     
tj01water: ti01water → tj01water     
 What we can see immediately is that the epistemic condition of correct 
beliefs is fully satisfied in this setting, since Isaac (in the first row) expects 
his partner John will not be mistaken in her beliefs about the Isaac’s actions, 
and vice versa (in the second row). In other words, if Isaac is choosing the 
beverage with the goal to coordinate, his choice of water is fully justifiable—
taking for granted particular frames and team-rationality—by his expecta-
tions that John will choose exactly the same, and that he also expects Isaac 
to choose water. 
 Variable frame theory predicts that whenever there is a coordination 
solution induced by salience, agents have beliefs that preserve correctness.28 
This result is also consistent for different variations in the structure of 
a frame. To show a general implication, let me assume a somewhat complex 
case of a similar game in which one of the agents is aware of an additional 
family of predicates, say Fx, and he or she recognizes its availability v(Fx) 
= p, where 0 < p < 1. This describes an aspect of uncertainty, as there is 
an agent now who may apply some predicates but cannot be sure that the 
other will do so as well (Bacharach and Stahl 2000, 224). Assume two pred-
icates a and b such that a ∈ Fx, b ∉ Fx and for simplicity also that E(a) ∩ 
                                                 
28 One explanation for these results invokes the well-established theorem that Nash 
equilibrium in principle rests on correct beliefs, see Tadelis (2013, chap. 5) or Perea 
(2012, chap. 4). Therefore, variable frame theory as an equilibrium refinement pro-
gramme carries the same epistemic load. 
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E(b) = ∅.29 And strategy s based on expected utility calculation (more 
specifically based on Bacharach’s (1997) trade-off theorem) where s = 
choosing a if EU(a) > EU(b) and s = choosing b if EU(a) < EU(b).30 For 
this reason the epistemic type of the agent i is as follows: 
ti01xs: p × tj01xs + (1 – p) × tj01b    
 tj01xs → ti01xs 
 tj01b   → ti01b   
Even in this general case of framed decision-making, agent i has correct 
beliefs regarding his co-player’s possible choices. Notwithstanding the fact 
that the agent believes with probability p that the other will be aware of 
the same frame, and with probability 1 – p that j will not notice Fx, the 
choice of the agent is such that she expects her co-player to think that the 
same choice is being selected. The result is consistent with correct belief 
assumption.31 
 Now, I move on briefly to the second epistemic aspect of theories, which 
is better known and has been already analysed—the issue of belief in ra-
tionality. The rationality assumption is a cornerstone of decision theory, 
and from a concise description of both theories, it is intuitively obvious that 
they depart from the game-theoretical standards. However, I would prefer 
to show how theories treat the epistemic aspect of rationality, and, thus, to 
address the question: What does an agent expect regarding the rationality 
of a co-player? And does the co-player believe in the rationality of the 
other? It should be evident that I am not dealing with the nature and 
comparative analysis of rationality requirements which I consider fixed for 
the respective theories and I have set aside as a separate research agenda. 
                                                 
29 Here I straightforwardly suppose that either choosing a, or choosing b is the 
team-optimal choice under a condition of the validity of the relevant frame.  
30 In the case whereby EU(a) = EU(b), the symmetry disqualification principle 
rules out both options. Unfortunately, this principle has not been confirmed empi-
rically; see Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997). 
31 The fact that ti01x might think that the other individual expects her to be ti01 
does not interfere with the conclusion concerning choices. Moreover, it was my 
assumption, in this example, to introduce some uncertainty about the other player’s 
frame. 
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My focus here is fully on the distinction that relates to the epistemic aspects 
of rationality. 
 At the start, I need to clarify the epistemic principle I will rely upon in 
the next analysis.  
Belief in rationality: 
An agent believes that his co-player is rational, and that the co-player 
also believes in his rationality. 
 If we look closely at the scheme of epistemic underpinnings of the solu-
tions to each theory, contrasting features emerge. Variable frame theory 
explains coordinative behaviour in accordance with the hypothesis that all 
individuals believe in their co-player’s rationality and believe that each 
partner in coordination believes in their rationality. For instance, epistemic 
type ti01water, who chooses (team) rational option, expects her co-player to be 
(team) rational because ti01water think tj01 will act in line with the recommen-
dation of the theory: i.e., she will also choose water.32 The result is self-
evident from the characterization of her type: 
ti01water: tj01water → ti01water     
 On a more general level of analysis, one may easily see that the theory 
respects the traditional axiom of the common knowledge of rationality 
(Tadelis 2013, 64-65). What does it imply about the epistemic background 
of coordination? A common feature is built into each solution based on 
variable frame theory implying that players are epistemically symmetrical 
in this important respect. A team-rational player is convinced that she is 
interacting with someone who also expects the other’s actions to be team-
rational. 
 But a contrasting conclusion arises whenever we examine belief in ra-
tionality in cognitive hierarchy theory. Clearly, it is not that surprising be-
cause we recognize that belief hierarchy is based on the gradual nature of 
rationality. A player at a certain level k is expecting interaction with an 
individual who is k-1 or lower. She also believes that her colleague will 
                                                 
32 Team rationality operates as a criterion for strategy selection in Hi-Lo game, but 
it is actually belief in rationality that secures equilibrium selection since it is ne-
cessary to consider another agent’s behaviour and its basis. 
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expect coordination with someone who is below her actual level, and so on, 
until L0 is reached. The entire level-based reasoning process is, thus, in 
principle, grounded in the bounded rationality paradigm, which, as a matter 
of a fact, means that belief in rationality is violated. The following epistemic 
type scheme captures this result more accurately: 
ti3beer: tj2beer → ti1beer → tj0alcoholic     
 One might raise an objection, pointing to the fact that all types of agents 
higher than L0 are genuinely rational because they make the best response 
to their alleged conception of the other’s type. However, it is important to 
bear in mind that belief in rationality across different levels is not of the 
same nature, though all these types are best-responding agents. It is abso-
lutely dissimilar when the agent i expects an encounter with tj2 or tj1. The 
first believes that her colleague is rational (L1-rational), while the second 
does not. After all, it seems that both theories rely on an entirely different 
epistemic background. In my opinion, the difference could be elegantly de-
picted in terms of epistemic symmetry and epistemic asymmetry.  
5. Epistemic (a)symmetry 
 The paper raised a thorny question: How can coordination be achieved 
by salience? I introduced salience as a key factor in establishing a desirable 
outcome in a coordination game in which communication and precedent are 
absent, and I presented two recognised explanatory pathways for this phe-
nomenon. The subsequent analysis of the epistemic components of theories 
has identified remarkable differences regarding correctness of beliefs and 
belief in rationality. Now, I would like to reveal the last piece in the puzzle 
by means of which it will be theoretically possible to say that there are two 
parallel ways of coordinating by salience.  
 My view of the coordination process via salience respects the fact that 
the two theories are equally suitable and comprehensible. However, their 
application is conditioned by specific circumstances affecting the relevant 
reasoning and decision-making. As we are already well acquainted with the 
epistemic scaffolding of the theoretical apparatus, I can explain the differ-
ence between these two theories by using simple epistemic terms—epistemic 
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symmetry and epistemic asymmetry. Also, I argue that they aptly elucidate 
why both processes of coordination by salience may occur and under what 
circumstances. Let me explicate these notions as follows: 
Epistemic asymmetry in coordination interaction: 
In a strategic interaction of a coordination kind, there is epistemic asym-
metry if, for every actively participating agent, it holds that he or she 
does not satisfy correct belief assumption and does not have belief in 
a co-player’s rationality.  
Analogically, the notion of epistemic symmetry can be defined in the very 
same way, except these two essential requirements do hold.   
 The purpose of these definitions is to build on earlier reflections and to 
demarcate the relevant context of coordination. In the previous section, 
I demonstrated several epistemic-type structures as an example of different 
relationships in the foundation of theories. In light of the above, it is clear 
that a coordination game with salience allows a number of diverse but par-
allel procedures. Either I assume that I and my co-player are symmetric in 
important epistemic aspects, or I expect asymmetric conditions to be valid. 
In the first situation, correct beliefs and belief in rationality, are prerequi-
sites for the use of subsequent framing and the application of team reason-
ing. Whereas in the second, the epistemic type of agents is such that they 
rather anticipate some level of incorrectness in beliefs and uneven standards 
of rationality, which leads to the utilization of best-response reasoning based 
on each agent’s cognitive efforts. 
 Imagine we are back in the bar with John and Isaac. How can epistemic 
conditions affect the resulting coordination? From what I have said, it is 
quite clear that John and Isaac may end up with the same drink (coordina-
tion is achieved) but as a result of different salience-based coordinating 
mechanism. For instance, If Isaac believes that John considers him to be 
tired and not caring too much about appropriate reasoning, then Isaac 
might reliably assess the situation as epistemically asymmetrical. In a sense, 
“John will think I am tired, and so he will choose beer because he thinks 
I will just pick something.” Moreover, epistemic asymmetry might be even 
bigger if we assume that John and Isaac are just colleagues from work who 
rarely meet, and they do not know each other very well. In this scenario, 
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application of the cognitive hierarchy reasoning looks plausible. On the 
other hand, by assuming that John and Isaac are close friends who trust 
each other, we can get an epistemically symmetrical context. John’s 
thoughts might be the following: “Isaac wants us to have the same drink 
and he knows that I want that too. Isaac will choose water because he 
thinks that I will be rational, and Isaac will believe that I think water is 
the best choice for both of us because it is a unique choice of non-alcoholic 
beverage.” Here, it is reliable to say that reasoning described by variable 
frame theory influence Isaac’s and John’s decisions. Of course, these two 
scenarios are just simple stories, but I hope they, at least, illustrate the 
major point of the paper—the epistemic context matter for coordination by 
salience. 
 Another implication of my reflections concerns the relationship between 
symmetrical and asymmetrical perspective. Based on epistemic grounds, it 
is more than plausible to say that variable frame and cognitive hierarchy 
theory are like two sides of the same coin. Under suitable epistemic circum-
stances, it is likely that an agent is well equipped to use the respective 
coordinating principle determined by the one theory without ruling out fu-
ture use of another principle. Thus, I think that this epistemic ramification 
can help us understand the diversity of coordination procedures and to rec-
ognize its contextual value. There might be coordination cases in which 
individuals consider strategic interaction favourable for epistemic sym-
metry: they trust their partner or have a positive evaluation of the group, 
or social bonds are tight and firm, etc. (Bacharach 2006, chap. 3; Colman, 
Pulford, and Rose 2008; Hindriks 2012). For all these factors influencing 
our perception of the epistemic environment of coordination games it seems 
legitimate to predict the outcome in accordance with variable frame theory. 
On the other hand, some conditions—payoff bias (Crawford, Gneezy, and 
Rottenstreich 2008) or prudential thinking (Cooper et al. 1990)—seem to 
fit with epistemic asymmetry, and favour cognitive hierarchy theory.  
 Finally, what does my conclusion say about the impact on experimental 
research? In most situations these theories imply the same result, yet when 
it comes to test cases predictions may diverge in various ways. My claim is 
that although we observe similar results (Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden 1994; 
Bardsley et al. 2010; Colman, Pulford, and Lawrence 2014) it proves little, 
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as we can still defend both theories. In my view, coordination by salience is 
a result of the involvement of two processes whose active impact on the final 
outcome is fundamentally—but not solely—determined by the epistemic 
niche of a given interaction. The challenge for future research might be to 
test experimentally factors entrenched in the epistemic conditions which in-
terfere with coordinating decisions and cause behavioural variations. 
6. Conclusion 
 In this paper, I have shown that if one wants to properly understand 
coordination by salience, it seems necessary to take into account the epis-
temic restrictions that are imposed on reasoning in different coordination 
procedures. Consequently, the two well-known and prominent theories, var-
iable frame theory and cognitive hierarchy theory should be regarded as 
complementary ways of explanation of salience-based coordination. Besides, 
I have suggested that the criteria of epistemic symmetry and epistemic 
asymmetry comprehensively specify tacit assumptions of theories and shed 
a light on the important difference build into their foundations. In variable 
frame theory, correct beliefs and belief in rationality, are prerequisites for 
the use of subsequent framing and the application of team reasoning. 
Whereas in cognitive hierarchy theory, the epistemic type of agents is such 
that they rather anticipate some level of incorrectness in beliefs and uneven 
standards of rationality, which leads to the best-response reasoning based 
on epistemic asymmetry. 
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